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Reconciliation is one of the most contested concepts in the 
scholarly debate on transitional justice, and arguably also the 
most difficult to measure empirically. This article provides an 
overview and assessment of current knowledge on the 
relationships between transitional justice mechanisms aimed at 
promoting “truth” and “justice” and the (end) goal of 
“reconciliation” in its multiple forms. It first spells out the 
claims about how to foster reconciliation and about how 
different mechanisms such as truth commissions, trials, 
amnesties, and local justice initiatives can be expected to 
contribute toward this end goal. Next, it takes stock of single-
case, comparative and broad sample impact studies of 
reconciliation processes. It finds that reconciliation may be most 
usefully studied as a process rather than as a goal, and that more 
attention should be given to the interplay between formal and 
local transitional justice processes. The article concludes that 
methodological challenges for cross-country analysis include (1) 
                                                 
1 This article has been prepared with funding from the Chr. Michelsen 
Institute’s Human Rights Programme, Bergen, Norway. I am indebted to 
Jessica Schultz for invaluable research assistance on this project. I would like 
to thank Trine Eide, Siri Gloppen, Ingrid Samset, Astri Suhrke, and Kari 
Telle for useful input and discussions developing this article. I also thank Lise 
Rakner and Eyolf Jul-Larsen for constructive comments on earlier drafts. 
Finally, thanks are due to the two anonymous reviewers of Transitional Justice 
Review for clarifying comments. 
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specifying a concept of reconciliation that is narrow enough to 
be measurable across cases, and (2) allowing sufficient time to go 
by before measuring the impact of mechanisms that are 
postulated to bring about reconciliation.  
 
Introduction 
In recent years, Kenya, the Solomon Islands, and Brazil have 
joined the growing number of countries that have established 
truth commissions, following the example first set by Argentina 
in 1983.2 Cambodians are in the process of prosecuting the 
worst human rights abusers from the Pol Pot regime of the 
1970s. Spaniards are digging up mass graves stemming from the 
fascist Franco regime. And donor governments are pouring 
millions of dollars each year into “transitional justice” projects.3 
 In the past two decades, there has been an almost 
unquestioned faith in the potential for transitional justice 
mechanisms such as truth commissions and trials to heal and 
transform wounded societies. The end goals commonly 
promoted include sustainable peace, rule of law, greater 
accountability, social reconstruction and a deepening of 
democracy. Although substantial intellectual capacity has been 
devoted to impact assessment of transitional justice in recent 
                                                 
2 By some accounts, the Uganda truth commission set up by dictator Idi 
Amin in 1974 was the first to be set up.  See United States Institute of Peace’s 
Truth Commission Digital Collection, 
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-digital-collection.  See 
also Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The 
Impact on Human Rights and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2010).  However, 
other well informed sources do not recognize this commission, possibly 
because it never issued a report. 
3 According to one report, private foundations in the United States alone 
invested over US$90 million in the transitional justice field between 2003 and 
2007. Louis Bickford and Debra Schultz, Memory and Justice: Confronting Past 
Atrocity of Human Rights Abuse (New York: International Centre for 
Transitional Justice, 2008), 24, as cited in Colleen Duggan. ‘“Show me your 
impact”: Evaluating Transitional Justice in Contested Spaces’, Special Issue: 
‘Evaluation in Contested Spaces,’ Journal of Planning and Program Evaluation 35.1 
(2010): 1. 
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years, the prevailing conclusion has been that we still know very 
little.4 Historically, the impact of transitional justice has been the 
business of single case studies, which has limited their 
generalizability. To amend this gap, in recent years a number of 
statistical studies has made advances in terms of finding 
plausible correlations between various transitional justice 
mechanisms (principally trials, truth commissions, and amnesty 
laws) on the one hand, and the various goals of transitional 
justice (“peace”, “rule of law”, “democracy”, “human rights 
abuses”) on the other hand.5 Although the methodologies for 
assessing impact are advancing,6 there is as of yet no 
                                                 
4 This was the common conclusion of three general literature review studies:  
Pierre Hazan, “Measuring the impact of punishment and forgiveness: A 
framework for evaluating transitional justice,” International Review of the Red 
Cross 88.861 (2006.): 19-47;  David Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, 
and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm? ” International Studies 
Review 6.3 (2004): 355-380.  Oskar N. T. Thoms, James Ron, and Roland 
Paris, “The effects of transitional justice mechanisms: A summary of 
empirical research findings and implications for analysts and practitioners, ” 
in CIPS Working Paper, Center for International Policy Studies (Ottawa, 2008), 1-91. 
See also Colleen Duggan, Guest Editor, “Special Issue: Transitional Justice 
on Trial—Evaluating its Impact,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 
(2010). 
5 Tove Grete Lie, Helga Malmin Binningsbø, and Scott Gates, “Post-Conflict 
Justice and Sustainable Peace,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4191 
(Washington, D.C.: April 2007);  Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling, 
“The Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin America,” Journal of Peace 
Research 44.4 (2007): 427;  Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining 
the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional 
Countries,” International Studies Quarterly 54.4 (2010): 939-963;  Tricia D. 
Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, eds., Transitional Justice in 
Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2010).  
6 See, for example, Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, et al., eds., Assessing 
the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009).  See also Duggan, ‘”Show 
me your impact,” for challenges and opportunities in evaluating the effects of 
transitional justice programs, though not the impact of the TJ mechanisms 
themselves on any given societal process or goal.  
3
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comprehensive analytical framework for assessing the impact of 
transitional justice mechanisms.  
In particular, there is a huge gap in our empirical 
knowledge with respect to what transitional justice may or may 
not do for reconciliation. “Reconciliation” has emerged as a 
specific goal of many transitional justice processes. But there is 
still much debate about the meaning of the term, and little 
empirical evidence of how different transitional justice 
mechanisms may affect achievement of this desired outcome. 
The bulk of impact assessment studies on reconciliation are 
single-case studies, which although may be superbly conducted 
have relatively limited value in terms of generalization. Indeed, I 
am not aware of any joint impact assessment of multiple 
transitional justice mechanisms employed in a given country to 
advance reconciliation. Nor I am aware of any cross-country 
analysis that systematically tries to assess the impact of a single 
mechanism, such as trials or truth commissions, on 
reconciliation.7 Finally, no existing statistical study has attempted 
to gauge the impact of transitional justice mechanisms on 
reconciliation. This is where the scholarly knowledge on how 
transitional justice processes may affect reconciliation stands at 
the moment. 
The modest aim of this article is therefore to assess the 
current scholarly knowledge about the relationships between 
transitional justice mechanisms and reconciliation. The rest of 
this article is divided into three parts. The first part provides a 
short overview of a selection of the many meanings and 
definitions of the two central concepts “transitional justice” and 
“reconciliation”, simply to point out some of the multiple ways 
                                                 
7 A few cross-country analyses of a small number of cases exist for single 
mechanism, which provide very useful insights, empirically as well as 
methodologically—though these studies do not measure impact on 
reconciliation. For the impact of truth commissions, see Eric Wiebelhaus-
Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and 
Impact,” International Studies Perspectives 8.1 (2007): 16-35; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 
Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies. 
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that reconciliation as a concept has been understood and used in 
the scholarly literature on transitional justice. 
The second part evaluates claims commonly made about 
the relationships between four key transitional justice 
mechanisms—trials, truth commissions, amnesties, and local 
justice processes—and reconciliation.8  Though many scholars 
before me have examined the various claims of transitional 
justice, this article is the first to systematically examine the claims 
with respect to reconciliation specifically.  I find that there is 
little scholarly agreement on what and how these four 
transitional justice mechanisms are meant to contribute to 
reconciliation (in its many diverse forms). Along with presenting 
the claims, I also examine some of the existing empirical 
research on the impact of these selected transitional justice 
mechanisms on reconciliation. The overarching question is to 
what extent there is empirical support for claims that societies 
that formally address past human rights violations have a better 
chance to reconcile after conflict than those that do not. 
Drawing on a non-exhaustive selection of findings from the 
growing body of single-case, comparative, and broad sample 
impact studies, I note that evidence is unevenly spread across 
cases, sparse, frequently conflicting, and at times highly 
contested.  
 The third part maps out some methodological challenges for 
future research on transitional justice and reconciliation and 
presents tentative suggestions of how to address these 
challenges. The two main methodological challenges to 
systematic comparative empirical research on how transitional 
justice mechanisms may affect reconciliation processes seem to 
be (1) to specify a concept of reconciliation that is narrow 
                                                 
8 Due to limits of space, we focus on these four key mechanisms rather than 
on the full range of transitional justice responses, which also include, inter 
alia, reparations, social shaming, lustration (banning of perpetrators from 
public office), vetting processes, public access to police records, public 
apologies, reburial of victims, literary and historical writings, and memorials. 
See Siri Gloppen, “Reconciliation and Democratisation: Outlining the 
Research Field,” Report no. 5, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, 2000. 
5
Skaar: Reconciliation in a Transitional Justice Perspective
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2013
  
 
 
 
 
59  Reconciliation in a Transitional Justice Perspective 
 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 54-103 
enough to be measurable across cases, and (2) to allow sufficient 
time to go by before measuring impact of the mechanisms that 
are postulated to bring about reconciliation.  
 
Defining transitional justice and reconciliation  
 
Defining transitional justice 
Though the roots of transitional justice stretch back much 
further, the concept was first coined by Ruti Teitel in 1991.9 She 
defined transitional justice as “the conception of justice 
associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal 
responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor 
regimes” (emphasis added).10 Teitel’s definition emphasises the 
international legal duty to prosecute genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, a perspective grounded in mid-
twentieth-century developments in human rights law. This 
definition has since been broadened, both in terms of the 
possible responses to violence and in terms of the desired 
outcomes of these responses.  
According to the UN Secretary General, transitional 
justice “comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a 
                                                 
9 See Ruti Teitel,  “Editorial Note: Transitional Justice Globalized,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2.1 (2008):1-4.  Another well-cited early 
user of the concept “transitional justice” is Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice. 
How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes, vols. I-III (Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).  See also Jon Elster, 
Closing The Books: Transitional Justice In Historical Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
10 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 
16 (Spring 2003): 1. In her earlier book, Transitional Justice, Teitel makes the 
point even more strongly, claiming that “only trials are thought to draw a 
bright line demarking the normative shift from illegitimate to legitimate rule.” 
Teitel distinguishes between criminal justice, historical justice, reparatory 
justice, administrative justice, and constitutional justice.  One main schism in 
the debate has been the distinction between backward-looking and forward-
looking justice. See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 7. 
6
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legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”(emphasis 
added).11 Along the same lines, Rachel Kerr and Eirin Mobekk 
define transitional justice as “the range of judicial and non-
judicial mechanisms aimed at dealing with a legacy of large-scale 
abuses of human rights and/or violations of international 
humanitarian law.”12 The International Center for Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ), a leading nongovernmental organisation in the 
field, stresses that transitional justice “seeks recognition for the 
victims and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation and 
democracy” (emphasis added).13 These broader definitions, then 
see criminal prosecutions as relevant, but not as the only or even 
the first measures to pursue. Moreover, transitional justice is 
now seen as a driver of transition rather than only as 
interventions that follow a transition.14 Its goals have become far 
more ambitious and less easily reconcilable with each other.15  
                                                 
11 UN Report on Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies, 23 August, 2004, S/2004/616.  
12 Rachel Kerr and Eirin Mobekk, Peace and Justice (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 
2007), 3.  
13 International Center for Transitional Justice, “What is Transitional Justice?” 
www.ictj.org. Similarly, Martha Minow takes a more general approach, writing 
that justice in transition amounts to replacing “violence with words and terror 
with fairness.” Presumably the instrumentalities through which this may be 
achieved are open. Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing 
History After Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 2. 
14 This issue has been addressed first and foremost in the case of Colombia. 
See, for example, Jemima García-Godos and Knut Andreas Lid, Truth and 
Reparation before the End of a Conflict - The case of Colombia, Oslo: NCHR Project 
Report, No. 55, University of Oslo, 2008; Maria José Guembe and Helena 
Olea, “No justice, no peace: Discussion of a legal framework regarding the 
demobilization of non-state armed groups in Colombia.,” in Transitional Justice 
in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice, eds. Naomi Roht-Arriaza 
and Javier Mariezcurrena (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
120-142; Maria Paula Saffon and Rodrigo Uprimny, Uses and Abuses of 
Transitional Justice in Colombia (Bogota: DeJusticia, 18 January 2007).  See also 
Special Issue on “Drivers of Justice,” Nordic Journal of Human Rights, guest eds. 
Elin Skaar and Astri Suhrke (forthcoming June 2013). 
15 See, generally, Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of 
Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 30.1 (2008): 95-118.  
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 This trend is partly attributable to the proliferation of 
supposedly “post-conflict” settings where violence in fact 
continues. In such circumstances, an overzealous focus on 
retributive justice may serve to sustain or even deepen the 
schisms between the warring parties—as, for example, in 
Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Northern Uganda.16 
Another reason is the recognition that measures other than 
formal criminal trials may serve similar if not identical purposes. 
South Africa’s well-documented experience with its Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission highlights one such option. Finally, 
affected populations themselves often have non-legalistic views 
of what justice requires. Conducting interviews in conflict-
affected communities in Mozambique, South Africa and 
Rwanda, Helena Cobban found that most people “speak about 
burning matters of economic justice before they say anything 
about seeking prosecutions, trials, or punishments of 
wrongdoers.”17 Nevertheless, Teitel notes, “the question remains 
whether there are any transitional justice baselines or any 
threshold minimum beyond which historical, psychological, or 
religious inquiry ought to be characterized as justice-seeking.”18 
In the end, and as noted by Charles Villa-Vicencio, “both 
traditional [African] and modern forms of restorative justice 
prioritize the need to salvage and affirm the moral worth and 
dignity of everyone involved.”19 
Teitel has divided the conceptual and empirical 
development sketched above into three major phases. Phase I, 
                                                 
16 Thoms, Ron, and Paris, “The effects of transitional justice mechanisms,” 
32; Lars Waldorf, “Mass justice for mass atrocity: Rethinking local justice as 
transitional justice,” Temple Law Review 79.1 (2006):1-88;  Sverker Finnström, 
“Reconciliation grown bitter? War, retribution and ritual action in northern 
Uganda,” in Localizing Transitional Justice: Justice Interventions and Priorities after 
Mass Violence, eds. Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
17 Helena Cobban, Amnesty after Atrocity? Healing Nations after Genocide and War 
Crimes (Boulder, Co.: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 239. 
18 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 89.  
19 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Walk with Us and Listen: Political Reconciliation in Africa 
(Washington D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 2009), 145.  
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between the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold 
War, was characterised by interstate cooperation, war crimes 
trials and sanctions, as seen in the Nüremberg and Tokyo trials. 
Phase II, the post–Cold War phase, coincided with the “third 
wave of democratization.”20 This period saw diversification of 
the formal mechanisms employed to bring about transitional 
justice, including a series of non-legal mechanisms such as truth 
commissions. The TJ discourse expanded from an almost 
exclusive focus on legal responses, intended primarily to ensure 
the rule of law, to a more diverse focus on “truth” and “justice,” 
with reconciliation as a desired outcome.21  
 In Phase III, the current phase, - and as reflected in the 
definition by Kerr and Mobekk (2007) - transitional justice has 
become an established component of post-conflict processes. 
Discussions of transitional justice frequently begin even before a 
conflict has ended. A particular feature of this phase is an 
increased interest in local or traditional processes of justice and 
                                                 
20 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
21 See, for example, David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes, and Luc Huyse, eds., 
Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook (Halmstad, Sweden: 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 
2003); Audrey R. Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, eds., Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver?  (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Phil Clark, The Gacaca courts, post-
genocide justice and reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without lawyers, vol. XII 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); James L. Gibson, “Does 
Truth Lead to Reconciliation? Testing the Causal Assumptions of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Process, ” American Journal of Political Science 
48.2 (2004): 201-217; Jean Marie Kamtali, “The Challenge of Linking 
International Criminal Justice and National Reconciliation: the Case of the 
ICTR,” Leiden Journal of International Law 16.1 (2003): 115-133; Jeremy Sarkin, 
“The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics, 
Human Rights, Due process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing 
with the Genocide,” Journal of African Law 45.2 (2001.): 143-172; Elin Skaar, 
“Argentina: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation, ” in Roads to Reconciliation, eds. 
Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen, and Astri Suhrke (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 
2005), 157-175.  
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reconciliation.22 Another feature of the third phase is 
diversification of actors: in addition to local actors, including 
ordinary citizens at the grassroots level, there has been a 
proliferation of donors eager to contribute to a “justice 
cascade.”23 Human rights and international legal norms are 
increasingly cited by both academics and practitioners.24  
 The transitional justice literature was initially dominated 
by legal scholars and political scientists, who tended to take a 
narrow approach to the topic. More recent contributions from 
philosophers, anthropologists, criminologists, sociologists, 
historians, and psychologists, amongst others, have made the 
field truly interdisciplinary. The debate has, as a result, become 
increasingly complex. From a focus on retributive justice and the 
rule of law, the discussion of transitional justice has broadened 
to include other elements such as forgiveness, healing and 
reconciliation. This increased diversity in the academic debate 
reflects the increased diversity of practical approaches to 
transitional justice on the ground. 
 The literature on transitional justice is full of claims 
about the intended or desired impact of various processes. 
Among the outcomes, justice, truth and reconciliation are cited 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Luc Huyse and Mark Salter, eds., Traditional Justice and 
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. Learning from African Experiences (Stockholm: 
IDEA, 2008); Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf, with Pierre Hazan, eds., 
Localizing Transitional Justice: Justice Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence, 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010; Lars Waldorf, “Mass 
justice for mass atrocity: Rethinking local justice as transitional justice,” 
Temple Law Review 79.1 (2006): 1-88; Joanna R. Quinn, ed., Reconciliation(s): 
Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2009). 
23 See Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Justice Cascade: The Evolution 
and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials,” Chicago Journal of International 
Law 2.1 (2001): 1-33. 
24 See, for example, Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, 
eds., The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
10
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most frequently.25 Claims regarding the interrelationship 
between these three have shifted over time. Justice and 
reconciliation have been seen both as conflicting and as mutually 
reinforcing. Likewise, publicly revealing the truth about past 
abuses has been considered an obstacle to reconciliation 
(especially in the short run) but also a prerequisite for 
reconciliation (in the long run).26 Truth, in turn, has been viewed 
as both an obstacle to and a prerequisite for justice.27  
 
Diverse definitions of reconciliation 
The focus on reconciliation in the field of transitional justice has 
been present since the beginning of the so-called second phase.28 
The aim of this section is to map out some of the numerous 
approaches to understanding and defining reconciliation to 
illustrate the many facets of this elusive concept. The aim is thus 
not to come up with a working definition of the concept, as I do 
not see the utility of aiming for one, universal definition.  
                                                 
25 Other desired outcomes include a strengthening of the rule of law, a more 
stable peace, accountability, social reconstruction, a deepening of democracy, 
and assurance that gross human rights violations will not happen again. 
26 In the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Madeleine Albright in 1994 argued that “establishing the truth 
about what happened in Bosnia is essential to—not an obstacle to—national 
reconciliation.” Cited in Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals 
of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 30.1 (2008): 96.  
27 In the 1980s and 1990s, there was “a suspicion that truth commissions are 
likely to weaken the prospect for proper justice in the courts, or even that 
commissions are sometimes intentionally employed as a way to avoid holding 
perpetrators responsible for their crimes.”  See Priscilla B. Hayner, 
Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 
2001), 86.  
28 See Carol A.L. Prager, “Introduction,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and 
Concepts, eds. Carol A. L Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 2003), 1. Central early works on reconciliation 
include Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After 
Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998); and Mark Osiel, Mass 
Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 
1997).  
11
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To begin with, reconciliation may be understood as a 
moral, political or religious concept. Whereas reconciliation 
previously has been “associated with the imperative of 
compromise in the name of stability,” more recent scholarship 
has associated reconciliation with “the long-term aspiration for 
political community based on consent and shared norms.”29 
Definitions of reconciliation range on a scale from “thin” to 
“thick.” 30 On the thin side, reconciliation may be understood as 
“nothing more than “simple coexistence”, in the sense that 
former enemies comply with the law instead of killing each 
other.”31 Thicker conceptions of reconciliation may include 
elements such as forgiveness, mercy (rather than justice – 
though sometimes also justice), a shared comprehensive vision, 
mutual healing and harmony. Karen Bronéus defines 
reconciliation broadly as “finding a way to balance issues such as 
truth and justice so that the slow changing of behaviours, 
attitudes and emotions between former enemies can take 
place.”32 The thin criteria of reduced violence or absence of 
violence are reasonably easy to observe, while the thick criteria 
are harder both to define and to observe.  
Reconciliation may be conceived as a goal or a process 
or both.33 According to Susan Dwyer, “reconciliation is 
fundamentally a process whose aim is to lessen the sting of a 
tension: to make the sense of injuries, new beliefs, and attitudes 
                                                 
29 Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 105.  
30 David A. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative 
Framework,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol A. L. 
Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 
2003), 54. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Karen Brounéus, “Reconciliation and Development,” a paper read at 
“Building a Future on Peace and Justice,” Nuremburg, 25-27 June, 2007, 3. 
33 Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink, “The Nature of Reconciliation as 
an Outcome and as a Process,” in From conflict resolution to reconciliation, ed. 
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11–38. 
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in the overall narrative context of a personal or national life.”34 
This understanding of reconciliation applies to both the micro 
and the macro levels. When it is defined as a process, 
reconciliation may be thought of as top-down or as bottom-up.  
 Reconciliation may happen at different levels. At the 
individual level, reconciliation must take place between the victim 
and the offender/perpetrator.35 Unlike apologies or expressions 
of forgiveness, which can be one-sided processes, reconciliation 
requires mutuality. That is, there must be a process of direct 
interaction between the victim and the perpetrator. The 
perpetrator asks forgiveness; the victim grants forgiveness. At 
the societal or national level, reconciliation may be understood as “a 
societal process that involves mutual acknowledgement of past 
suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and 
behaviour into constructive relationships towards sustainable 
peace.”36 There may be cases where reconciliation may be 
psychologically impossible—at either the individual or group 
level.37 Some authors make a parallel distinction between micro- 
and macro-level reconciliation, in which “the former typically 
involves local, face-to-face interactions—say between two 
friends—and the latter concerns more global interactions 
between groups of persons, or nations, or institutions, which are 
often mediated by proxy.”38 Group or national-level 
reconciliation may also be referred to as either interethnic 
                                                 
34 Susan Dwyer, “Reconciliation for Realists,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: 
Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol A. L. Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), 106. 
35 Marc Forget, “Crime as Interpersonal Conflict: Reconciliation Between 
Victim and Offender,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. 
Carol A. L. Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2003), 111-35. 
36 Brounéus “Reconciliation and Development,” 5. On societal reconciliation 
(a society reconciling with its past and groups reconciling with each other), 
see also Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, chapter 10.  
37 Dwyer, “Reconciliation for Realists,” 91-110. 
38 Ibid., 93. 
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reconciliation or political reconciliation, depending on the root 
of the conflict.39  
 A number of elements are believed to play a critical role 
in reconciliation, helping to “repair torn relationships between 
ethnic, religious, regional or political groups, between 
neighbours, and between political parties.”40 These essential 
components of reconciliation vary depending on the level, the 
type of conflict, and other factors. Acknowledgement,41 forgiveness,42 
and healing43 may be particularly important at the individual level. 
Remembrance of past violations has also been mentioned as a 
prerequisite for reconciliation, at both the individual and the 
                                                 
39 See, for example, Claire Moon, Narrating Political Reconciliation: South Africa's 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2008). 
See also Charles Villa-Vicencio, Walk with Us and Listen: Political Reconciliation 
in Africa. (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009). 
40 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 133. 
41 “…[A]cknowledging… wrongs will assist victims to heal, will mark a 
separation from the wrongdoings of the past and a commitment to reform, 
and may constitute a first step towards reconciliation.” Trudy Govier,  “ 
What is Acknowledgement and Why is it Important?” in Dilemmas of 
Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol A. L. Prager and Trudy Govier 
(Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), 84. See also Michael 
R. Marrus, “Overview,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. 
Carol A. L. Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2003). 
42 See, for example, Thomas Brudholm and Thomas Cushman, eds., The 
Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Phil Clark, “The Rules (and Politics) of 
Engagement: The Gacaca Courts and Post-Genocide Justice, Healing and 
Reconciliation in Rwanda,” in After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, eds. Phil Clark and 
Zachary D. Kaufman (London, Hurst, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009); Quinn, Reconciliation(s). 
43 See, for example, Cobban, Amnesty after Atrocity?  See also Alcinda 
Honwana, “Healing and Social Integration in Mozambique and Angola,” in 
Roads to Reconciliation, eds. Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen and Astri Suhrke (Lanham, 
Md.: Lexington Books, 2005);  Kimberly A. Maynard, Healing Communities in 
Conflict. International Assistance in Complex Emergencies  (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999); Gearoid Millar, “Assessing Local Experiences of 
Truth-Telling in Sierra Leone: Getting to ‘Why’ through a Qualitative Case 
Study Analysis,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 (2010): 477-496. 
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group/national levels.44 Another central element of 
reconciliation is mutual respect, that is, willingness to judge people 
as individuals and not brand them with group stereotypes.45   
 The next part spells out in more details the scholarly 
claims connecting reconciliation to four central transitional 
justice mechanisms: trials, truth commissions, reparations, and 
local justice initiatives. It also provides illustrations of how these 
claims are supported – or not – by empirical evidence.  
 
What transitional justice is supposed to achieve: Scholarly 
claims and empirical evidence 
 
Trials and reconciliation: Claims and evidence 
Claims 
Claims regarding the positive role of trials in promoting 
reconciliation are relatively recent. Until the late 1980s (and 
based mainly on the Latin American experience), prosecutions 
were considered anathema to the goal of securing peace, and 
thereby reconciliation.46 Recent scholarship is more nuanced. 
Today, many advocates of prosecution make the case that trials, 
whether alone or in combination with other mechanisms such as 
truth commissions, can contribute to peace, and hence 
reconciliation. Mendeloff, for example, argues that the truth 
telling that takes place during trials uncovers individualized 
responsibility for crimes, which promotes group reconciliation.47 
Others are more sceptical to the potentially 
reconciliatory effect of trials. Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. 
                                                 
44 “... [T]here can be no reconciliation without remembrance,” Marrus, 
“Overview,” 29. 
45 Gibson, “Does Truth Lead to Reconciliation?” 205. 
46 The potential causal relationship(s) between peace and reconciliation is a 
large scholarly debate and will not be ventured into here for reasons of time 
and space. Note, however, that in the author’s opinion reconciliation forms 
an integral part of what is frequently referred to as “positive peace”, i.e. a 
‘thicker’ peace that goes beyond the mere absence of large-scale violence.  
47 Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding,” 
358-59. 
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Weinstein caution that  “the assumption that holding individuals 
accountable for atrocities alleviates despair, provides closure, 
assists in creating and strengthening democratic institutions and 
promotes community rebuilding overstates the results that trials 
can achieve.”48 According to these authors the causes of war 
must be understood and addressed before social repair (which 
reconciliation is defined as a part of) can be achieved. Placing 
individual accountability does in their view not necessarily solve 
the collective guilt problem. They stress “that the focus on 
punishment of perpetrators may have the inadvertent 
consequence of transforming these wrongdoers into scapegoats 
or victims in order to perpetuate the political mythology of a 
particular social group. This may exert an untoward effect that 
undercuts the advantages of punishing perpetrators.”49  
Other scholars, like Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, 
also suggest that prosecuting perpetrators of human rights after 
periods of conflict may undermine peace and lead to renewed 
violence or an increase in repression.50 Hunjoon Kim and 
Kathryn Sikkink claim that in situations of civil conflict and war, 
human rights prosecutions will exacerbate human rights 
violations.51 Under these scenarios, trials may be detrimental to 
reconciliation. Many argue that “digging up the past” in post-
conflict settings can trigger new tensions by provoking a 
backlash on the part of those to be prosecuted – and hence limit 
the possibilities for reconciliation. According to Leebaw, “the 
criminalization of political violence is likely to be controversial 
and potentially destabilising, whether this takes the form of 
prosecution and punishment or the acceptance of state 
                                                 
48 Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, “Violence and Social Repair: 
Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 24.3 (2002): 601. 
49 Ibid., 592. 
50 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice,” International Security 28. 3 
(2004): 5-44. 
51 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights 
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries,” 939–963.  
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responsibility through official acknowledgement, apology, or 
reparations.”52 Where wars have not yet ended, the prospect of 
prosecutions many reduce leaders’ incentives to put down their 
guns.53 Most sceptics do not entirely deny the potential benefit 
of trials, but they urge a sequenced approach that postpones 
legal punishment until peace is sufficiently established.54 
 
Evidence 
Although prosecution for gross human rights violations have 
become more common over the last decade, empirical evidence 
is inconclusive as to how and in which ways trials may 
potentially influence reconciliation – be it at the individual, 
societal or national levels.55  This is in part because too short 
time has gone by for most of these trials to say anything sensible 
about the potential impact on reconciliation, and in part because 
it is difficult to trace the exact mechanisms whereby trials 
influence the process of reconciliation. Finally, most trials are, 
after all, conducted principally for other purposes than to 
achieve reconciliation – like doing justice, correct wrongs of the 
past, prevent future violations, establish a break with the past, 
strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions etc.  
 This fact is reflected in the statistical studies that try to 
gauge the effects of trials: none of the studies to date attempt to 
measure the implications for “reconciliation” directly. Yet, they 
                                                 
52 Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 97.  
53 For example, in the case of Northern Uganda, critics, including Ugandan 
President Museveni, have argued that the arrest warrant against rebel leader 
Joseph Kony by the International Criminal Court, has hindered peace 
negotiations.  
54 See Cobban, Amnesty after Atrocity? 
55 At the beginning of the new millennium, successful prosecution of rights 
abusers in countries in transition from authoritarian rule or after violent 
armed conflict was still rare. A decade later, trials are taking place in a 
growing number of countries, both in national courts and in international or 
mixed tribunals. Yet there are even more examples of countries where trials 
have been avoided altogether. There are a host of reasons why it may be 
difficult to conduct trials, ranging from poorly functioning judicial systems to 
scarcity of resources to weak political will or the presence of amnesty laws.  
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try to measure impact on factors which in turn may influence 
reconciliation. Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling, in 
their analysis of all Latin American countries for the period 
1979-2004, find that human rights trials have not undermined 
democracy or led to an increase in human rights violations or 
exacerbated conflict in Latin America.56 Expanding the universe 
of cases beyond Latin America to include 100 transitional 
countries across the world for the period 1980-2004, Kim and 
Sikkink find that human rights trials help decrease repression 
(defined as torture, summary execution, disappearances, and 
political imprisonment) and hence have a positive effect on 
human rights protection.57 In contrast to the two studies, Olsen, 
Payne and Reiter, using 161 countries over 40 years (1970-2007), 
find that trials alone do not have statistically significant and 
positive effects on democracy and human rights.58 
 The case material detailing these statistical findings at the 
country level is surprisingly scarce. The effects on reconciliation 
of trials conducted in national courts seem to be particularly 
understudied.59 Empirical studies aiming to show that trials 
facilitate reconciliation between former warring parties (at the 
societal or national level) are mainly based on UN sponsored 
war crimes tribunals, or so-called mixed courts – in addition to a 
large literature on the gacaca trials in Rwanda (see separate 
treatment under section on local justice initiatives). There is in 
fact now an emerging literature on the role of genocide trials 
with respect to reconciliation. This may suggest (though I have 
no proof) that different expectations are tied to genocide trials 
than for other kinds of human rights trials conducted in national 
courts.  
                                                 
56 Sikkink and Booth Walling, ”The Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin 
America,” 427.  The authors have created a new dataset on truth 
commissions and trials for past human rights violations. In this particular 
article, they only explore the effects of trials.  
57 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights 
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries,” 939-963.  
58 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.  
59 In fact, I have come across no such study. 
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), for example, was explicitly established to 
help bring an end to the on-going conflict in the Balkans60 and 
facilitate reconciliation. As Teitel explains, “It was hoped that 
condemnation of ethnic persecution, together with individual 
accountability, would transcend identity politics and advance a 
shift towards a more liberal order.”61 Although the ICTY failed 
in this respect,62 the argument remains relevant. By alleviating 
collective guilt through the identification of discrete “bad guys,” 
prosecution can cool the ardour for collective vengeance. On a 
practical level, criminal punishment removes troublemakers and 
deters future ones.63 Nevertheless, recent research on the ICTY, 
which draws on fieldwork in Bosnia, proposes that “the linkage 
between criminal trials and reconciliation is especially tenuous in 
genocide cases.” Janine Natalya Clark questions the argument 
that “genocide trials foster reconciliation by dealing with the 
broader responsibility of bystanders, identifying those 
individuals with genocidal intent and facilitating closure” and 
cautions “against an over-reliance upon criminal trials.”64 
  This is a point that has been pushed by other scholars 
earlier. In their edited collection on post-war social 
reconstruction, Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein use qualitative 
and quantitative studies to examine whether criminal trials in 
post-genocide Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia served the 
transitional goals they set out to achieve. They conclude that 
“there is no direct link between criminal trials (international, 
national, and local/traditional) and reconciliation… In fact, we 
                                                 
60 Launched under the Security Council’s Chapter 7 powers, the ICTY was 
created to stop conflict. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 
1993).  
61 Ruti Teitel, “The law and politics of contemporary transitional justice,” 
Cornell International Law Journal 38.3 (2005): 837-862. 
62 See Fletcher and Weinstein, “Violence and Social Repair.”  
63 Payam Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice 
Prevent Future Atrocities?” American Journal of International Law 95.1 (2001): 
12.  
64 Janine Natalya Clark, “The ‘crime of crimes’: genocide, criminal trials and 
reconciliation,” Journal of Genocide Research 14.1 (2012): 55-77. 
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found criminal trials—and especially those of local 
perpetrators—often divided small multi-ethnic communities by 
causing further suspicion and fear.”65 Almost a decade later, in-
depth research on the legal responses to mass violence in 
Rwanda concludes that “of the available methods of legal 
redress in post-genocide Rwanda, the gacaca courts are most 
effective in performing the function of reconciling trauma and 
establishing collective memory.”66 
 
Truth commissions and reconciliation: Claims and 
evidence 
Claims 
Opinions have shifted as to whether or not truth promotes 
reconciliation. Until quite recently, revealing the truth about 
gross human rights violations was seen as an obstacle to 
reconciliation, in that it could promote animosity, reopen old 
wounds, and increase political instability. Currently, however, 
“the idea that a durable peace requires countries to address past 
violence is now widely held and promoted by influential leaders 
and institutions under the broad heading of “transitional 
justice.”’67  Truth commissions are expected to have an impact at 
different levels. 
 Starting with the national or political level, the fact that a 
government sets up a truth commission may in itself be 
perceived as an effort to uncover crimes of the past, thus 
publicly acknowledging that violence has taken place – which is 
important for those who have suffered repression and violence. 
Truth commissions have been seen as a way to promote political 
                                                 
65 Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, eds., My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice 
and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 323. 
66 Carla De Ycaza, “Performative Functions of Genocide Trials in Rwanda: 
Reconciliation Through Restorative Justice? An Examination of the 
Convergence of Trauma, Memory and Performance Through Legal 
Responses to Genocide in Rwanda,” African Journal of Conflict Resolution 10.3 
(2010): 9-28. 
67 Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 96. 
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reconciliation by fostering dialogue across lines of political and 
social conflict.68 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue 
that truth commissions can foster deliberative democracy, and in 
turn reconciliation, by encouraging “accommodation to 
conflicting views that fall within the range of reasonable 
disagreement.”69 Reports issued by truth commissions may also 
have a reconciliatory effect. According to David A. Crocker, “if 
reconciliation in any... sense is to take place, there must be some 
agreement about what happened and why.”70 The official, 
authoritative historical record provided by truth commissions 
may establish a “new shared history,” thus fostering group 
reconciliation.71 One must note, however, with James L. Gibson, 
that “a truth process pointing to unilateral blame is not likely to 
produce reconciliation.”72 Another point articulated by Cavallaro 
and Albuja, is that the mandates of truth commissions are too 
limited to allow them to contribute effectively to the 
consolidation of democratic regimes. Citing research that shows 
a correlation between citizens’ experiences of corruption and 
low public legitimacy of their governments, James Cavallaro and 
Sebastian Albuja argue that it is necessary to address economic 
crimes as well as civil and political ones in order to strengthen 
prospects for reconciliation.73 
                                                 
68 Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law.  
69 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, “The Moral Foundations of Truth 
Commissions,” in Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, eds. 
Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000), 41. 
70 Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs.”  
71 This argument and its logic are reviewed by Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, 
Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding,” 358. 
72 James L. Gibson, “Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided 
Nation?” Politikon 31.2 (2004): 149.  
73 James Cavallaro and Sebastian Albuja, “The Lost Agenda: Economic 
Crimes and Truth Commissions in Latin America and Beyond,” in Kieran 
McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, eds., Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots 
Activism and the Struggle for Change (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), 140. Their 
point is made on the basis of the experience of the Liberia’s truth 
commission, which did have a mandate to address corruption.  
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 Moving from the political to the societal and individual 
levels, there are many and conflicting claims connected to the 
process of truth telling itself. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter include 
truth telling as one of four necessary mechanisms for achieving 
reconciliation.74 Payam Akhavan asserts that “truth-telling 
promotes interethnic reconciliation through the individualisation 
of guilt in hate-mongering leaders and by disabusing the people 
of the myth that adversary ethnic groups bear collective 
responsibility for crimes.”75Along the same lines, truth telling is 
believed to contribute to psychological healing of individual 
victims and thus promotes social healing and group 
reconciliation.76 Some claim that “truth telling demanded by 
victims is essential for reconciliation.”77 Yet, this is not 
uncontroversial as other scholars claim that truth-telling may 
lead to re-traumatisation of the victims.   
 Not all scholars then view truth commissions favourably. 
Many of the claims for the relationship between truth telling and 
reconciliation in a context of peace building are flawed or at least 
questionable. In David Mendeloff’s opinion, “truth telling 
advocates claim more about the power of truth telling than logic 
or evidence dictates.”78 To succeed in promoting reconciliation, 
truth commissions must be managed in a sensitive way.  While 
truth telling can be considered a cornerstone of transitional 
justice, it is also essential to recognize that “too much truth-
telling can be counterproductive and instead of healing social 
cleavages can generate more.”79  
   
                                                 
74 Huyse and Salter, Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. 
75 Payam Akhavan, “Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? 
A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 20.4 (1998): 766.  
76 This, according to Mendeloff, is one of the primary claims of the post-
conflict and peace-building literatures. Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-
Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding,” 358. See also Hayner, Unspeakable 
Truths and Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness. 
77 Prager, “Introduction,” 12. 
78 Ibid.  See also Gibson, “Overcoming Apartheid.”  
79 Verwoerd 2003, cited in Prager, “Introduction,” 12. 
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Empirical evidence 
Many of the claims above are of course based on specific 
country experiences with truth commissions. Although the 
mandates of truth commissions vary widely, many have had 
reconciliation as a specific end goal.80 Yet surprisingly few 
scholarly studies have examined the impact of truth 
commissions in general, and even fewer have examined their 
impact on reconciliation in particular.81 This is also true for all 
existing statistical studies. The picture portrayed by statistical 
analysis of the impact of truth commissions more generally on 
factors which may directly or indirectly impact on reconciliation 
is mixed. Whereas Kim and Sikkink find that truth commissions 
help decrease repression (defined as torture, summary execution, 
disappearances, and political imprisonment) and hence have a 
positive effect on human rights protection (and presumably 
reconciliation), Olsen et. al. find that truth commissions in 
isolation have a negative rather than the expected positive impact 
                                                 
80 This is reflected in the names of many commissions, such as the National 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Chile); Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (East Timor); National Reconciliation 
Commission (Ghana); National Commission for Truth and Justice (Haiti); 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Peru); Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Sierra Leone); Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South 
Africa); Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Serbia and Montenegro 
(Yugoslavia). 
81 Several studies that have attempted to analyze the impact of truth 
commissions all conclude the same. See Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-
Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding,” and Hazan, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-
Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding” Two studies on truth commissions 
that provide very useful insights, empirically as well as methodologically are 
Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth,”; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth 
Commissions and Transitional Societies. However, Wiebelhaus-Brahm’s (2007) 
analysis of truth commissions in 78 countries from 1980-2003 reaches no 
convincing conclusions regarding their impact on human rights protection 
and democratic practice. He does not address the impact on reconciliation. 
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on democracy and human rights, both in post-authoritarian and 
in post-armed conflict contexts.82  
These inconclusive findings are also reflected in the few 
analytical impact studies that exist at the country level. The 
methodologically stringent case studies on impact of truth 
commissions on reconciliation in the African context are almost 
exclusively from South Africa,83 giving skewed case-based 
knowledge from the African continent. In Latin America, the 
following cases have received the most scholarly attention: Chile, 
Argentina, Guatemala, and Peru. For Asia, only East Timor 
seems to have been subject to scholarly study focusing on the 
links between truth commissions and reconciliation.  
There are several reasons for this limitation in empirical 
material. First, many truth commissions have been set up only in 
the last few years, so that not enough time has passed to 
effectively measure or assess their impact. Second, many of the 
studies of truth commissions are based on moral conviction and 
rely primarily on anecdotal evidence. Third, and most important, 
much of the literature on truth commissions is limited to 
descriptive narrative and lacks an analytical focus on results. 
Studies that do attempt to gauge success or failure often stop 
with the immediate reception of the commission’s report, rather 
than assessing the long-term impact on goals such as 
reconciliation.84  
In the rest of this section I have decided to limit my 
discussion principally to two case studies: South Africa and East 
Timor. This for two reasons: (1) data availability and (2) 
                                                 
82 See Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights 
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries, ” and Olsen et al., Transitional Justice 
in Balance. 
83 Indeed, outside South Africa, there are hardly any individual-level data 
analyses of reconciliation processes available.  See Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 
“Uncovering the Truth,” 20. A notable exception is recent work on the 
healing potential of the Sierra Leone truth commission. See Millar, “Assessing 
Local Experiences of Truth-Telling in Sierra Leone,” 477-96. 
84 This point has been highlighted by several scholars on different occasions. 
See, for example, Duggan, “Transitional Justice on Trial.” 
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methodology. The substantial body of empirical evidence for 
evaluating both the South African and East Timor experiences 
with truth commissions’ impact on reconciliation gives a more 
nuanced reading than for those countries for which there may be 
only a single, or perhaps two, case studies that evaluate the truth 
commission’s impact on reconciliation. Furthermore, these two 
very different cases aptly illustrate some of the conceptual and 
methodological dilemmas involved in evaluating the impact of 
truth commissions on reconciliation. They also show how 
scholars may arrive at very different conclusions with respect to 
the same truth commission experience.  
 
The impact of truth commissions: Lessons from South Africa  
Of all truth commissions to date, it is the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that has most effectively 
captured world public attention as well as provided a model for 
subsequent commissions – in spite of the uniqueness of this 
commission. Not surprisingly therefore, the TRC has by far the 
most abundant data, assessed by South African as well as 
international scholars. 
 To start off with, the TRC had a far more expansive 
mandate than most truth commissions. Its task was to go 
beyond truth finding to promote national unity and 
reconciliation across social divisions, facilitate the granting of 
amnesty to those who made full factual disclosure, restore the 
human and civil dignity of victims by providing them an 
opportunity to tell their own stories, and make 
recommendations to the president on measures to prevent 
future human rights violations. The TRC recognised multiple 
types of truth—narrative, forensic, historical and social or 
dialogic.85 It also recognised and made use of multiple 
understandings of reconciliation. Evaluating the impact of the 
                                                 
85 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (Cape Town: 
Juta and Company Ltd., 1998), vol. 1, chapter 5, cited in Erin Daly, “Truth 
Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in Times of Transition,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2.1 (2008): 25. 
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TRC on reconciliation has thus proved a complicated task for 
scholars, who have arrived at strikingly different answers to the 
question of whether the TRC produced truth that has 
contributed to reconciliation.86 In the following I have selected 
two comprehensive studies to illustrate how the application of 
complementary methodologies may come to different 
conclusions.87 Rather than view these two studies as comparing 
“apples and pears,” as some scholars may object to, I find that 
these studies jointly shed valuable light on the complexities 
involved in gauging the impact of a truth commission on 
reconciliation. 
 Based on rigorous analysis of individual-level data 
collected in an extensive survey of 3,700 individual respondents, 
beginning in 2001, James L. Gibson concluded that truth has 
contributed to reconciliation in South Africa. “The truth and 
reconciliation effort,” in his words, “was successful at exposing 
human rights abuses by all sides in the struggle over apartheid—
thereby contributing to the country’s collective memory about 
its apartheid past.”88 He added, however, that different racial 
groups assess the truth generated by the TRC differently. A 
majority of white, Asian and Coloured South Africans surveyed 
said that truth contributed to interracial reconciliation. Among 
black South Africans, however, truth seemed to contribute little 
to reconciliation. Even though this may be a disappointing 
finding, he writes, “in no instance is truth associated with 
irreconciliation.”89   
 This raises an interesting question: Do truth 
commissions lead to more reconciliation amongst the people 
                                                 
86 The issue of different types of truths produced by truth commissions (in a 
comparative perspective) is addressed in Audrey Chapman and Patrick 
Randall, “The Truth of Truth Commissions: Comparative Lessons from 
Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala,” Human Rights Quarterly 23.1 (2001): 1-43.  
87 James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004); Chapman and van der Merwe, 
Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa. 
88 Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid, 207.  
89 Ibid., 214.  
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who were not directly affected by a conflict by giving them a 
deeper understanding of the past, even though no effect on 
reconciliation is seen in victims or others who were directly 
involved? If so, truth commissions may play a vital role in 
reconciliation at the national level even while posing risks for 
those on whom these processes depend.90 Gibson, however, 
explicitly questions whether lessons from the South African 
TRC apply elsewhere, given the particular circumstances of 
apartheid. Gibson does not argue on the basis of this analysis 
that truth inevitably leads to reconciliation. In his words, “the 
most puissant characteristic of the collective memory created by 
South Africa’s TRC was its willingness to attribute blame to all 
parties in the struggle over apartheid... Another effective but 
idiosyncratic element of South Africa’s truth and reconciliation 
process was its emphasis on non-retributive forms of justice... A 
different truth process might well have led to an entirely 
different outcome.”91  
 A second in-depth study, by Audrey Chapman and Hugo 
van der Merwe, provides a comprehensive evaluation of the 
TRC process and its impact on South African society. Drawing 
on an extensive analysis of the victim hearings, amnesty 
hearings, institutional hearings, and public opinion survey data, 
as well as on extensive interviews with a range of TRC staff, 
people who worked with the commission, and members of 
different communities affected by it, the authors raise 
fundamental questions about the TRC and indeed about all truth 
commissions. They question the capacity of such bodies to carry 
out the mandates assigned to them and particularly to achieve 
the difficult balance between truth finding and reconciliation. At 
best, they argue, the South African TRC established only “an 
incomplete truth,” which in turn may have had a negative impact 
on reconciliation. Part of the problem rested with the failure of 
                                                 
90 Brounéus “Reconciliation and Development.” 
91 James L. Gibson, “Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided 
Nation?” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 603.82 
(2006): 103.  
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the commissioners to agree on what they meant by the “truth” 
or whose “truth” should be documented and made public. In 
addition, the TRC never defined precisely what it meant by the 
term “reconciliation,” making any evaluation of impact very 
difficult.   
 These authors also conclude that the TRC “effectively 
put a hold on attempts to secure justice by survivors of human 
rights abuses,” and thus the process “robbed survivors of justice 
for over 1000 incidents of abuse.”92 They ask whether the work 
of a truth commission may in fact deepen rather than close the 
wounds of victims and survivors of gross human rights 
violations, at least in the short term. And they stress the need to 
distinguish between short-term and long-term effects on society, 
including reconciliation.93 In short, even evaluations of the 
model TRC in South Africa point to sharply different 
conclusions on whether or the net impacts contribute to 
reconciliation.  
  
The impact of truth commissions: Lessons from East Timor/Indonesia  
The Timor-Leste and Indonesian Commission of Truth and 
Friendship (CTF) was established in 2005 to investigate the 1999 
violence that erupted in connection with East Timor’s 
declaration of independence from Indonesia. It completed its 
final report in 2008. The commission’s stated goals were “to 
conduct a shared inquiry with the aim of establishing the 
conclusive truth about the reported human rights violations and 
institutional responsibility, and to make recommendations which 
can contribute to healing the wounds of the past and further 
                                                 
92 Chapman and van der Merwe, eds., Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, 
284. 
93 See also Wilhelm Verwoerd, “Toward a Response to Criticisms of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in Dilemmas of 
Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier 
(Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), 245-78. 
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promoting reconciliation and friendship and ensuring the non-
recurrence of similar events” (emphasis added).94 
 Though it may be too soon to evaluate the impact of this 
commission on Timorese society, observers have drawn 
attention to deficiencies in the process that have severely 
reduced the chances for positive short-term or long-term impact 
on reconciliation.95 A report from the ICTJ concluded that the 
CTF was created not to ensure truth telling and reconciliation, 
but rather as a means to stave off calls by the United Nations 
and the larger international community to deal with the atrocities 
through criminal justice processes. The UN boycotted the 
commission because it considered it deeply flawed. The ICTJ 
concluded that “the CTF has not yet delivered substantive 
transitional-justice benefits, and its public hearings have 
seriously compromised the goals of truth and reconciliation... 
fundamental weaknesses in the Commission’s Terms of 
Reference... were compounded by the poor design and 
inadequate preparation of the public hearing process.”96 In 
particular, the CTF’s terms of reference included a mechanism 
for recommendations of amnesty while prohibiting 
recommendations for new judicial processes. What this example 
illustrates is that the political intentions behind a truth commission, 
as well as the manner in which the truth commission hearings 
are conducted, may be decisive for its impact on society. 
To briefly sum, these selected case studies point to two 
important issues relevant for impact assessment of truth 
                                                 
94 Final Report of the Commission of Truth and Friendship (Ctf) Indonesia - Timor-
Leste, ix; available from 
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/Reparations/CTFReportEn.pdf; 
accessed 27 June, 2012.  
95 These points are taken from “Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth: 
Monitoring Report on the Commission of Truth and Friendship in Indonesia 
and Timor-Leste,”—found in email from President Juan E. Méndez. The 
monitoring report is accessible at http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-
Indonesia-Commission-Monitoring-2008-English.pdf; accessed August 2011. 
96 Megan Hirst, “Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth: Monitoring Report 
on the Commission of Truth and Friendship in Indonesia and Timor-Leste,” 
(New York, NY: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2008), 1. 
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commissions on reconciliation: The South African case 
underlines the complexity of the concept and goal of 
reconciliation. The East Timor/Indonesia case serves as a 
cautionary example for assuming that all truth commissions can 
be assumed to be productive, and thus have a positive impact on 
reconciliation. 
 
Amnesties and reconciliation: Claims and empirical 
evidence 
The claims 
Amnesty, rather than prosecution, was the common response to 
mass atrocity between the end of the Second World War and the 
end of the Cold War. In spite of the world-wide increase in 
criminal prosecution of past human rights violations, the 
number of countries imposing amnesties for gross human rights 
violations, either during peace negotiations or after the end of 
violence, has in fact been growing in recent years.97 This implies 
that amnesties are frequently accompanied by some form of 
criminal accountability.  
Indeed, amnesties have increasingly been considered a 
transitional justice mechanism in its own, not only as an anti-
thesis to prosecutorial justice. Prior to about 1990, it was 
assumed that amnesties contributed to impunity rather than to 
safeguard human rights.98 After the establishment of the ICC in 
2002 and the spread of universal jurisdiction, there has been a 
growing international legal trend against using amnesties for the 
most serious crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide. Simultaneously, there has been a more 
nuanced scholarly debate with respect to what purposes 
amnesties may serve, especially in transitions from violent armed 
conflict.  
                                                 
97 Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the 
Peace and Justice Divide (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008). 
98 See Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2. 
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Amnesties have historically been used when 
governments are either unwilling or politically unable to 
prosecute alleged human rights violators after the political 
transition to a democratic regime. Amnesties come in many 
shapes and forms: self-amnesties, partial amnesties, blanket 
amnesties etc.99An important point to note is that amnesties do 
not necessarily foreclose all kinds of prosecution, as some crimes 
or some kind of perpetrators may be excluded from the amnesty 
law.  
The main argument for amnesties is that they can, in the 
short term, reduce political conflict and lessen the chances of 
recurring violence, thereby fostering peace and reconciliation. 
Amnesties have often been considered vital to secure transitions 
from authoritarianism to democracy, or from armed conflict to 
peace. As convincingly argued by Mark Freeman, “for societies 
to regenerate after mass violence or genocide, there may, in fact, 
be no other choice.”100 The transition itself is considered a 
prerequisite for reconciliation to take place. More than anything 
else, legal amnesties have been considered a tool to ensure 
political stability, and thus a necessary measure to facilitate 
reconciliation. Critics, however, counter that amnesty cannot 
lead to long-term reconciliation, among other reasons because 
“amnesia is the enemy of reconciliation.”101  
Increasingly, scholars have started to argue for 
combining amnesties with other measures. Mallinder contends 
that amnesties can even have positive impacts “provided that 
they are introduced in good faith and are accompanied by other 
transitional justice mechanisms and institutional reforms.”102 
When combined with truth commissions, amnesties may 
                                                 
99 Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions, 18. See pp. 3-7 
for a comprehensive definition of amnesty, and the many types of amnesties.  
100 Freman, Necessary Evils, 6. 
101 Luc Huyse, “The Process of Reconciliation,” in Reconciliation after Violent 
Conflict: A Handbook, eds.  David Bloomsfield, Teresa Barnes, and Luc Huyse 
(Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA), 2003), 30. 
102 Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions, 18.  
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encourage the disclosure of more extensive information. This 
information may, in the long run, be used for prosecutions and 
hence promote justice, adding another element needed for 
reconciliation. 
 
Empirical evidence 
The recent creation of data bases on amnesties has facilitated 
some interesting statistical cross-country analysis. Olsen et al 
(2010) find that amnesties used alone do not have statistically 
significant and positive effects on “democracy” and “human 
rights”. However, they show that amnesties in combination with 
trials or truth commissions explain improvements in those two 
political goals. This is a surprising finding given that trials and 
amnesties are generally considered incompatible.103 
Moving to single case studies, the subject of impact of 
amnesties on reconciliation is an understudied topic. The cases 
of postcolonial Angola, Mozambique, and post-Franco Spain, 
where blanket amnesties for past crimes were issued but no 
other formal mechanism was put in place to pursue truth, justice 
or reconciliation after the end of civil war, seem to defy the rule 
that collectively forgetting the past will open the way for 
renewed conflict.104 Yet, this does not mean that societies have 
become reconciled. For reasons of time and space I here limit 
my very brief synopsis to these three countries. The question as 
to how far these societies have reconciled with their past 
remains open. Moreover, if they have reconciled, the question is 
whether this is due to the presence of an amnesty law, or to local 
justice processes that may have developed in the absence of 
adequate state response to violence. Here the picture is certainly 
mixed.  
Angola has managed to secure a negative peace, but 
though this has not been carefully documented using survey 
material, there are reasons to believe that the country has a long 
                                                 
103 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance. 
104 See Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict 
Peacebuilding,” 367.  
32
Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss1/10
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2012.1.1.4
  
 
 
 
 
  Skaar  86 
 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 54-103 
way to go in terms of reconciliation.105 Mozambique is often put 
forward as a successful case of political reconciliation, but that 
may be due to the implementation of a series of local 
reconciliation practices rather than to the presence of an 
amnesty law. The effectuation of reconciliation processes rooted 
in local rituals and practices may have compensated for the 
absence of government initiated transitional justice processes 
(see more below). Spain too has recently revisited its violent past 
through attempts at digging up mass graves from the Franco 
fascist period, signalling that reconciliation is at best partial and 
that people still have a need to know what happened in the past.   
 
Local justice initiatives and reconciliation 
Claims 
Scholars of local justice practices in the context of political 
transition emphasize the potential role of these practices, such as 
ritual ceremonies, in promoting reconciliation among families 
and communities – especially in the context of absence of 
formal transitional justice mechanisms. In recent years, a large 
and growing literature has developed on this subject. The main 
general claims coming out of this burgeoning literature is that 
civil society initiated processes aiming for some form of 
restorative justice will help mend the social fabric after a society 
has been torn apart by internal armed conflict or genocide. 
Typically, rituals enacted to promote reconciliation directly 
engage victims and perpetrators, contain elements of dialogue or 
rites, aim at social inclusion rather than punishment, and are 
ultimately aimed at making people who were former enemies 
cope with living in the same community or society without 
resorting to violence.  
 
Empirical evidence 
                                                 
105 See Elin Skaar, Camila Gianella, and Trine Eide, “Angola: Peace but no 
democracy in the shadow of impunity,” in Elin Skaar, Camila Gianella, and 
Trine Eide, A way out of violent conflict: The impact of transitional justice on peace and 
democracy. (manuscript under review with Intersentia, 2012). 
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Lars Waldorf in 2006 observed that the literature that existed on 
local justice included “mostly theoretical, macro-level 
assessments of state-initiated mechanisms, rather than empirical, 
micro-level studies of how those mechanisms are actually 
functioning at the local level.”106 Since then, a lot of serious 
empirical work has been undertaken that provides interesting 
insights regarding how local justice practices may contribute to 
reconciliation. The study of local justice practices has so far been 
limited to individual case studies. It has not been subject to 
systematic cross-country comparison, though there has been a 
proliferation of edited volumes on local justice in the last couple 
of years, some of them with a cross-regional focus.107 Yet, this is 
probably the part of the transitional justice literature that has 
brought the most valuable insights to the understanding of 
reconciliation after periods of acute state-sponsored violence. 
The vast bulk of literature on local justice practices and 
reconciliation centre on African experiences (principally 
Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Mozambique), though 
local justice processes in countries such as East Timor, 
Guatemala, Northern Ireland, and Israel-Palestine have also 
attracted some scholarly attention. All of these studies take on a 
micro-perspective, most of them are based on interview 
material, and most study the idiosyncratic local justice processes 
that are unique to each of the countries in question. Unlike 
formal transitional justice mechanisms, which have become an 
export “industry” where international funding and international 
expertise has “transported” various transitional justice 
mechanisms to virtually all corners of the world, local justice 
practices are rooted in local experiences and are therefore not 
immediately comparable. Since providing detailed analyses of 
each case falls outside the scope of this article, this section 
                                                 
106 Waldorf, “Mass justice for mass atrocity,” 6.  
107 See, among others, Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman, eds., After 
Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda 
and Beyond (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Huyse and Salter, 
Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict; Shaw and Waldorf with 
Hazan, Localizing Transitional Justice; Quinn, Reconciliation(s). 
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simply draws attention to the variety of local justice practices 
and points to some findings that may have implications for the 
study of reconciliation. I have selected four country studies. Two 
illustrate bottom-up approaches (Northern Uganda and 
Mozambique) and two illustrate top-down approaches to local 
justice (Rwanda and East Timor). The main themes linking these 
cases are processes that aim to foster healing, forgiveness, and 
social reintegration of perpetrators of violence.  
 
Northern Uganda 
In Northern Uganda, traditional Acholi conflict resolution 
practices, particularly a process known as mato oput, is said to 
assist the reintegration of ex-combatants, including abducted 
children and “bush wives,” into their original societies. James 
Ojera Latigo describes the process as follows:  
 
Tolerance and forgiveness are enshrined in the principles of 
mato oput and other associated rituals. … The process 
recognizes and seeks to salvage and affirm the moral worth 
and dignity of everyone involved—victims, perpetrators and 
the community at large—in the pursuit of a decent society, 
with the primary focus on coexistence and the restoration 
of relationships between former enemies as a basis for the 
prevention of the recurrence of gruesome crimes… The act 
of slaughtering the goat and ram and exchanging the heads 
reminds the perpetrators and those witnessing the 
ceremony that there is a price to be paid for violating the 
agreed rules of coexistence. Mato oput embodies the 
principle that society and the perpetrator contribute to the 
extent possible to the emotional restoration and repair of 
the physical and material well-being of the victim.108 
                                                 
108 James Ojera Latigo, “Northern Uganda: tradition-based practices in the 
Acholi region,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: 
Learning from African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm: 
IDEA, 2008), 108. Latigo and Ali report similar rituals among the Mende in 
Sierra Leone. See James Ojera Latigo and Joe A. D Ali, “Reconciliation and 
traditional justice: tradition-based practices of the Kpaa Mende in Sierra 
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Latigo acknowledges that the Acholi justice system is not 
suited to address war crimes or crimes against humanity, and it 
therefore does not include the “LRA architects of terror” or, for 
that matter, the Ugandan government within its remit.  
 
Mozambique 
In central Mozambique, according to research by Victor Igreja, 
magamba spirit ceremonies in a community lead to reconciliation, 
“since the spirits create conditions for reconciliation between 
the living people, between the living and the spirits and among 
the spirits themselves.”109  Igreja, who has observed the 
magamba spirit ceremonies in central Mozambique for more than 
a decade, claims that “socio-cultural processes such as those 
presented by magamba spirits and healers and war survivors in 
general in Gorongosa unequivocally demonstrate the potential 
of human beings to utilize available mechanisms for a peaceful 
resolution of war-related conflicts.”110 Alcinda Honwana, who 
studied the role of therapeutic strategies and healing 
mechanisms used in rural areas of Mozambique to deal with the 
war, argues that “an acknowledgement of the atrocities 
committed and the subsequent break from the past is articulated 
through ritual performance.” Honwana concludes—contrary to 
the assumptions underlying the processes of formal truth 
commissions—that reconciliation may sometimes be more 
efficiently achieved through symbols and rituals than through 
words.111 From a more outsider’s macro-perspective, Helena 
                                                                                                      
Leone,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from 
African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm: International 
IDEA, 2008), 44.   
109 Victor Igreja, “Gamba Spirits and the Homines Aperti: Socio-Cultural 
Approaches to Deal with Legacies of the Civil War in Gorongosa, 
Mozambique,” a paper read at Building a Future on Peace and Justice, 
Nüremberg, 25-27 June 2007, 12.  
110 Ibid.  
111 Alcinda Honwana, “Healing and Social Integration in Mozambique and 
Angola,” in Roads to Reconciliation, eds. Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen, and Astri 
Suhrke (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005). 
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Cobban argues that the combination of official amnesty and 
local reconciliation suits the unique nature of this country’s 
conflict, in which many combatants, including children, were 
forced to participate. Cobban reports from her interviews a 
“very high level of general satisfaction in the ‘forgive, heal and 
rebuild” policy that the government adopted in 1992.”112 
 
Rwanda  
Few countries in the world – if any – have dealt as extensively 
with its genocidaires as Rwanda. The perpetrators of the genocide 
have been dealt with through three sets of courts: The ICTR, the 
national courts, and the local courts known as gacaca. Unlike the 
traditional justice processes in Northern Uganda and 
Mozambique that emerged out of civilians’ need to deal with a 
traumatic past, gacaca in Rwanda are centrally managed at the 
official political level. According to official claims, the process 
known as gacaca was meant to “put the genocide behind us” 
rather than end impunity as such.113 Scholars differ widely in 
their assessments of the potential of gacaca, but the balance of 
early evidence on impact indicates that it is unlikely to 
accomplish either of these goals.  
Waldorf, critically assessing the impact of the gacaca 
courts on the goals of retributive justice and reconciliation, 
reported in 2006 that a one-sided focus on Hutu crimes during 
the genocide had deepened, rather than smoothed, ethnic 
divisions.114 Almost half of all Hutu men can be considered 
genocide suspects, following accusations and confessions in 
gacaca proceedings.115 A good number of those have been 
deprived of their right to vote.116 Some have been detained for 
more than 10 years. Waldorf also noted that for the period he 
                                                 
112 Ibid., 193.  
113 Cited in Waldorf, “Mass justice for mass atrocity,” 50. 
114 Ibid., 75. In fact, in April 2005, more than 6500 Hutu fled Rwanda, 
reportedly for fear of being killed in revenge for being named in gacaca.  
115 Estimates range from 700,000 to 1 million genocide suspects. Ibid., 80. 
116 Following convictions of category 1 or 2 crimes, according to the Gacaca 
law.  
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examined, perpetrators who confessed rarely showed remorse, 
and they often received light sentences. Therefore, argued 
Waldorf, it was unlikely that gacaca would contribute to a sense 
of justice among survivors. In fact, as one Rwandan psychologist 
noted, “Confessions and seeking forgiveness do not remove 
fears and anger—they even increase them.”117 Waldorf too 
observed that “in several communities, pre-trial gacaca 
proceedings caused a worsening of interethnic social relation” 
and cautioned that we should lower expectations with respect to 
what local justice – indeed any kind of transitional justice – can 
reasonably be expected to accomplish after mass atrocity.118 
Along the same lines, although slightly less critical, Trine Eide, 
based on her in-depth knowledge of Rwandan culture, 
concluded that under the apparent mask of peaceful coexistence, 
both Hutus and Tutsis perceived the gacaca processes as imposed 
by the government. What Rwandans at the grassroots level say 
with respect to reconciliation is different from what they feel in 
their hearts.119 
 Some of this pessimism has over time given way to 
cautious optimism as the gacaca proceedings have unfolded in 
almost 9000 gacaca courts across the country. In the view of 
Clark, a prominent specialist on gacaca, “critics have ignored 
gacaca’s capacity to facilitate restorative justice via meaningful 
engagement between parties previously in conflict, in the form 
of communal dialogue and cooperation, which are crucial to 
fostering reconciliation after genocide.” Based on careful 
empirical analysis, Clark finds reason for “qualified optimism 
regarding gacaca’s contribution to justice, healing and 
reconciliation after the genocide.” Still, he thinks it is too soon 
to pass a final judgment on these processes.120  
 
                                                 
117 Ibid., 74, full reference note 439.  
118 Ibid., 75 and 86.  
119 Trine Eide, Pretending peace: discourses of unity and reconciliation in Rwanda, M.A. 
Thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen, Norway, 
2007. 
120 Clark, “The Rules (and Politics) of Engagement,” 300-301. 
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East Timor 
Like Rwanda, East Timor too has opted for a top-down 
approach in an attempt to facilitate reconciliation among former 
warring parties. Recent violence between groups in the east and 
west of East Timor as well as on-going tensions with Indonesia 
suggest that reconciliation at the national and international levels 
remains elusive.121 The Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation (CAVR) also initiated a continuing Community-
Based Reconciliation Process (CRP) that deals with minor 
offences. The record of that program is mixed. According to a 
program review published in 2004: 
 
While [the CRP] has resolved some problems and facilitated 
the integration of many deponents back into their 
communities it has raised a host of new issues that are left 
unresolved. ... The voluntary nature of the process has 
meant that only some deponents have participated in the 
process, leading to resentment amongst victims and 
deponents alike of those who have not yet come forward… 
More critically, the CRP has inadvertently ‘stirred the pot’ 
with respect to serious crimes issues, raising expectations 
that the ‘big fish,’ some of whom are perceived to be living 
back in the community, will now be investigated and 
prosecuted. Indeed, while serious crimes issues remain 
unresolved, it is perhaps premature for many to 
contemplate questions of ‘community harmony’.122 
  
Observers have noted that local practices adopted into the 
transitional justice strategy have tended to reinforce pre-existing 
power structures. Survivors frequently deferred to the village 
head’s opinion with respect to punishment, and in some cases 
                                                 
121 I have written a section on East Timor/Indonesia under the heading of 
truth commissions as well as under the heading of local justice initiatives 
above since they have not been treated together in the literature. 
122 Judicial System Monitoring Program, “Unfulfilled Expectations: 
Community Views on the CAVR’s Community Reconciliation Process,” Dili: 
East Timor, 2004, 40.  
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the fear of retribution prevented people from requesting stiff 
sanctions or from speaking out at all. Within the CVAR itself, 
there was evidence that staff members exercised bias to protect 
family members who were known perpetrators from 
punishment.123  
To sum up, while local justice practices such as the ones 
depicted above may promote reconciliation within a given 
community, they usually do not apply to divisions at the national 
level. In three of the countries mentioned (Northern Uganda, 
Mozambique, and East Timor), the practices were used only 
within specific ethnic groups or specific regions. Since war 
typically brings the mixing of groups and heightens conflicts 
between them, such local practices are not suitable for settling 
many types of disputes. For instance, among the East Timorese, 
reconciliation—what is termed locally nahe biti, or stretching the 
mat—is perceived as “embracing not only the notion of 
meeting, discussion and agreement in order to reach a consensus 
among the opposing factions… it is also part of a grand process 
that aims to link the past and the future and bring society into an 
ultimate state of social stability, where peace, tranquillity, and 
honesty prevail.”124 But as implemented in the Community-
Based Reconciliation Process, it explicitly targeted only small-
time criminals.125 In Rwanda, by contrast, those involved in the 
genocide were treated an all three sets of courts, depending on 
their level of involvement and command. The achievements of 
the gacaca should therefore ideally be explored in the context of 
the existence of three sets of courts three seeking justice and 
truth/prosecution, and the inherent tensions between them.  
                                                 
123 Elizabeth Stanley, “The Political Economy of Transitional Justice in 
Timor-Leste,” in Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle 
for Change, eds. Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008), 184.  
124 Dionísio Babo-Soares, “Nahe Biti: Grassroots Reconciliation in East 
Timor,” in Roads to Reconciliation, eds. Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen and Astri 
Suhrke (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 225. 
125 Stanley, “The Political Economy of Transitional Justice in Timor-Leste,” 
182.  
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Tensions between transitional justice mechanisms and 
reconciliation 
Despite claims regarding the positive effects of various TJ 
mechanisms on reconciliation, the traditional view of transitional 
justice as a threat to national reconciliation has not been refuted. 
Because “truth commissions and criminal tribunals investigate 
extremely divisive and violent histories,” writes Bronwyn Anne 
Leebaw, “they have often been viewed as obstacles to 
reconciliation and charged with “opening old wounds,” 
generating political instability and interfering with forward-
looking political change.”126 Since these mechanisms have also 
been promoted as vehicles for reconciliation, the debate has 
focused on tensions, trade-offs and dilemmas associated with 
transitional justice. In the 1990s, the dominant perspective was 
of a forced choice between truth (seen as a second-best option) 
and justice (the preferred option).127 More recent scholarship has 
portrayed truth and justice as mutually dependent and mutually 
reinforcing. The dominant current view is that societies seeking 
reconciliation should employ a variety of transitional justice 
mechanisms rather than just one – echoing what Fletcher and 
Weinstein (2002) suggested a decade ago.128 Proponents of this 
                                                 
126 Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 96-97. 
127 Robert I. Rotberg, and Dennis Thompson, eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality 
of Truth Commissions (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2000). Hayner argues forcefully that truth commissions should not be seen as 
a replacement for prosecutions, that is, not as a second-best or weaker 
option. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, chapter 7.  
128 For instance, Crocker, in “Reckoning with Past Wrongs,” argues that 
societies seeking reconciliation in the wake of serious wrongdoings should 
strive to (1) investigate the truth about the relevant past events, (2) provide a 
public platform for victims to tell their stories about what happened to them, 
(3) establish some measure of accountability and appropriate sanctions for 
the most significant perpetrators of wrongdoings, (4) comply, and show 
compliance with, the rule of law, (5) appropriately compensate the victims of 
wrongdoing, (6) contribute to institutional reform and long-term 
development, (7) reconcile previously opposed groups and individuals, and 
(8) deepen and strengthen the quality of public deliberation.  
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view assume that different transitional justice mechanisms can 
be mutually reinforcing and complementary, contributing jointly 
to the goal of reconciliation. 
 Leebaw, however, makes a strong case that more 
attention should be given to their irreconcilable goals. Referring 
to the political role of transitional justice mechanisms, she 
contends that “their efforts to expose, remember, and 
understand political violence are in tension with their role as 
tools for establishing stability and legitimating transitional 
compromises.”129 Thus, the debate has not yet reached a 
conclusion. We agree with Brounéus that “claims made of the 
relationship between for example truth, justice, peace and 
reconciliation are in need of empirical backing.”130  
 
The impact of mixed approaches on reconciliation: 
Empirical evidence 
Although many countries have employed two or more 
transitional justice mechanisms in combination, hardly any 
empirical qualitative cross-country comparative analysis exists on 
the complementary or contradictory effect of these mechanisms 
on the process(es) of reconciliation. Another key issue which 
seems to be seriously underplayed in the literature is how the 
timing and sequencing of TJMs may affect reconciliation in the 
short term and the long term. Those who have dealt with 
systematic cross-country evaluation of the impact of various 
transitional justice mechanisms have avoided the concept of 
reconciliation altogether. Instead, the steadily increasing number 
of statistical studies published in recent years has attempted to 
gauge the impact of TJMs on more measurable concepts such as 
“peace”, “democracy” and “human rights” – all of which may 
relate to, but are different from, reconciliation. Three of the to-
date four existing statistical studies (which I have referred to 
                                                 
129 For a good overview of the changing ideas about the relationship between 
transitional justice and reconciliation, see Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals 
of Transitional Justice,” 97-99. 
130 Brounéus, “Reconciliation and Development,” 3-4. 
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earlier in this article) deal with the joint effects of two or more 
of the transitional justice mechanisms examined here (truth 
commissions, trials, and amnesties). I find it useful to provide a 
very brief summary of their main findings here, since these 
studies have advanced the TJ field methodologically and may 
provide insights useful for assessing the impact of transitional 
justice on reconciliation in future studies.  
In an early attempt to evaluate the impact of transitional 
justice mechanisms, Lie, Binningsbø and Gates find that the 
impact of multiple transitional justice mechanisms on the 
duration of post–civil war peace in general is weak.131 Kim and 
Sikkink, by contrast, find empirical support for claiming that 
human rights trials as well as truth commissions help decrease 
repression and hence have a positive effect on human rights 
protection.132 In the largest and most comprehensive cross-
country study of transitional justice to date, Olsen, Payne and 
Reiter find that single TJ mechanisms used alone do not have 
statistically significant and positive effects on democracy and 
human rights.133 By contrast, the authors show that specific 
combinations of mechanisms—trials and amnesties; or trials, 
amnesties, and truth commissions—explain improvements in 
those two political goals. Notably, they find support for a 
combination of two TJ mechanisms—trials and amnesties—that 
are generally considered incompatible. They contend that trials 
provide accountability and amnesties provide stability, leading to 
improvements in democracy and human rights. Another 
interesting finding is that truth commissions have a positive 
impact when combined with trials and amnesties. These findings 
are true across different kinds of contexts.  
                                                 
131 Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice and Sustainable Peace.” Lie et al. 
understand peace as negative peace, i.e. the absence of civil war. We may take 
this to correspond to a “thin” definition of reconciliation, though the parallel 
is strenuous. 
132 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights 
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries."   
133 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance. 
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To sum up, these three statistical studies produce very 
different findings with respect to the impact of trials and truth 
commission on “peace”, “democracy” and “human rights”. The 
only study that assesses the impact of amnesties, views amnesties 
positively when combined with truth commissions and trials. 
The lesson drawn from these studies, relevant for studies of 
reconciliation, is that one is likely to arrive on very different 
conclusions when using different definitions/understandings of 
the dependent variable. This is, of course, a methodological 
problem inherent in the social sciences. Yet, our hunch is that 
the concept “reconciliation” poses particular problems for cross-
country analysis. 
 The potential for carrying out studies of multiple 
transitional justice mechanisms on reconciliation is certainly 
there. Several countries have employed so-called mixed 
approaches to reconciliation, combining two or more 
transitional justice mechanisms. Limiting the countries to those 
that have employed two or more of the four examined in this 
article, we end up with the following non-exhaustive list: Chile 
(truth commission and amnesty, later trials); Argentina (truth 
commissions, trials and amnesty); Brazil (amnesty, later truth 
commission); Uruguay (amnesty, later truth commissions and 
trails); Peru (amnesty, truth commission, later trials); Guatemala 
(amnesty, truth commission, later trials, local justice processes); 
the former Yugoslavia (international war crimes tribunal, 
national trials); Rwanda (international war crimes tribunal, 
national trials, gacaca process); Uganda (International Criminal 
Court and local reconciliation mechanisms); Sierra Leone (truth 
commission, trials, Kpaa Mende rituals); Mozambique (amnesty, 
magamba rituals); East Timor/Indonesia (national trials, UN-
sponsored trials, national truth commission, international truth 
and friendship commission, nahe biti local justice initiatives). 
 
Methodological challenges and recommendations for 
future research 
As more and more countries make use of transitional justice 
mechanisms to deal with a violent past, there is an urgent need 
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for reliable empirical evidence on the effects such mechanisms 
are likely to have. As the cases of South Africa and Rwanda 
illustrate, identifying effects is not easy, even in countries that 
have been studied extensively. Yet it would be a mistake to rely 
on assumptions about presumed effects rather than on 
knowledge we can glean from experience to date.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the concern 
with impact assessment and appropriate methodology in the 
transitional justice field is of relatively recent origin. I support 
authors who advocate the use of social science techniques to add 
more rigour to transitional justice analysis.134 Using what we do 
not know as a point of departure, I suggest that at least three 
different areas pertaining to reconciliation need systematic 
scholarly attention. Research priorities include: 
• More in-depth studies of single cases employing two or 
more TJ mechanisms, looking at how these interact and 
affect the process of reconciliation. 
• More systematic qualitative comparative cross-country 
analysis exploring the impact of the same combination 
of TJ mechanism(s) on reconciliation processes. 
• More systematic qualitative analysis of the interplay 
between formal TJ processes and local/traditional 
reconciliation processes.  
For all three scenarios, specific attention should be given to the 
different contexts in which these transitional 
justice/reconciliation processes play out. My hunch is that 
formal as well as informal transitional justice mechanism will be 
more explicitly geared towards facilitating reconciliation in 
contexts of armed conflict/mass violence than in post-
authoritarian situations simply because the level of interpersonal 
violence may be assumed to be on a substantively smaller scale 
in authoritarian regimes.  
                                                 
134 See Phuong Pham and Patrick Vinck, “Empirical Research and the 
Development and Assessment of Transitional Justice Mechanisms,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 1.2 (2007): 231-248. 
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To advance empirical knowledge on reconciliation, there 
must therefore be more systematic attention to research design. 
The major challenges may be grouped into four categories, 
namely, concepts, causal connections, appropriate methods, and 
time frames.  
 
How to investigate reconciliation 
I propose that reconciliation should be understood as a process 
rather than as a goal. This first and foremost because it seems 
impossible to conclude in any given empirical situation that an 
individual or a society is fully reconciled. More usefully, I think, 
reconciliation could be thought of as a continuum, ranging from 
“thin” to “thick”. David Crocker’s three-fold typology may be a 
useful starting point. He distinguishes between “simple co-
existence” (i.e. low levels of reconciliation), “democratic 
reciprocity” (i.e. intermediate levels of reconciliation) and a 
comprehensive reconstruction of social bonds between victims 
and perpetrators.135  
For stringent cross-country analysis there should be a 
minimal (“thin”) or intermediary rather than maximal (“thick”) 
definition so that the reconciliation process can be measured by 
observable phenomena such as reduced levels of violence and 
increased levels of civic trust. For in-depth case studies, by 
contrast, it may be more useful to study the process of 
reconciliation as taking place at multiple levels (the individual, 
the societal, the national). As existing research suggests, 
understandings of reconciliation are highly context-specific and 
may differ from one group to another within the same country. 
It is important to pay attention to those differences if we want 
to gain a deeper understanding of reconciliation processes.  
 
                                                 
135 David A. Crocker, “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil 
Society,” in Truth v. Justice. The Morality of Truth Commissions, eds. Robert I. 
Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2000). 
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Concepts and causal connections 
In any analysis it is essential to clarify the independent variables 
postulated to have an effect on reconciliation. It matters whether 
we look at the impact of transitional justice mechanisms on 
reconciliation, or whether we focus on the relationships between 
“truth” and/or “justice” (both of which may be brought about by 
a range of different formal and informal transitional justice 
mechanisms) on reconciliation. Starting with the latter, the 
concept of “justice” has generated an expansive set of 
subcategories: forward-looking justice, backward-looking justice, 
retributive justice, restorative justice, retroactive justice, 
reparatory justice, administrative justice, local justice, traditional 
justice, historical justice, and more. Each term has different 
content and connotations. Local perceptions of what justice 
means will probably display even more variance than the 
collection of terms listed above. Any rigorous study must 
carefully delimit the particular concept of justice and the 
mechanism used for the cases considered. “Truth” is another 
problematic concept needing clarification and operationalization. 
As demonstrated in the South African case, it matters what kind 
of truth and whose truth is the focus of analysis.  
Turning to the transitional justice mechanisms, it is 
particularly important to determine through comparative analysis 
the precise criteria that define each mechanism, rather than 
presuming that all mechanisms called by the same name are 
comparable. In the case of truth commissions, for example, 
there is clear agreement that South Africa’s TRC, established to 
investigate decades of violence under the apartheid system, 
belongs on the list. But what about the Greensboro Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, set up in the U.S. state of North 
Carolina in 2004 to look a specific episode of killings by the Ku 
Klux Klan in 1979? Or Uruguay’s small, underfunded, NGO-
initiated truth commission? Are we talking about a single 
mechanism in all three cases? Similarly, when discussing the 
impact of punitive justice or trials on the recovery of “truth” and 
“justice”, can a trial of selected junta members by national courts 
(as in Argentina) be sensibly compared with the thousands of 
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prosecutions taking place in the gacaca processes in Rwanda, or 
in the UN ad hoc tribunal set up for that country? I leave these 
questions unanswered, but they illustrate the choices that must 
be made in any cross-country comparative study.  
In the transitional justice literature, concepts such as 
truth, justice and reconciliation, in addition to carrying a 
multiplicity of meanings, are often treated simultaneously as 
independent variables and dependent variables. This ambiguity 
obviously complicates the task of establishing causal 
connections. An important and related challenge is to clarify 
whether we are “measuring” the impact of a given transitional 
justice mechanism at the individual, community, regional or 
national level.  
 
Deciding on an appropriate scientific method 
Using interview or survey data is the most fruitful way of gaining 
in-depth understanding of the multiple layers of reconciliation 
processes. For in-depth cross-country analysis there is an 
additional need for more easily accessible quantifiable or 
operational measures. There is much room for additional 
investigation of what combination of methods may be most 
fruitful.  
 
Determining the appropriate time frame for analysis 
If the study focuses on the effects of specific transitional justice 
mechanisms on reconciliation, the minimum time frame is set by 
the prerequisite that the TJ mechanism in question must have 
completed its mandate. Trials must have been conducted in a 
timely fashion, with fair procedures. Truth commissions must 
have completed their work and issued a report. Moreover, 
implementation of the recommendations made by truth 
commissions with respect to reparations, institutional reforms 
and memorials (an additional set of TJ mechanisms not 
discussed in this article) should also be considered, an important 
point that is frequently overlooked in the literature. 
 All this points to the need to allow sufficient time for 
analysing the impact of (formal and informal) transitional justice 
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mechanisms on reconciliation processes. Trials, truth 
commissions and local justice initiatives may take years to 
complete; amnesty laws may be passed only to later be modified 
or overturned; and there is frequently an additional time lag 
between the publication of truth commission recommendations 
and their implementation. Reconciliation processes inevitably 
and indisputably take time. While the need to wait for results 
before making a firm evaluation may be seen as an obstacle, it is 
also an opportunity. That is, there is the possibility of beginning 
research at a stage when it is possible to capture the dilemmas 
and dynamics of formulating and implementing transitional 
justice strategies, even though the final effects cannot yet be 
measured.  
 
Concluding remarks 
From this overview, we conclude that no scholarly agreement 
exists regarding the expected impact of transitional justice 
mechanisms on the process of reconciliation. Empirical evidence 
on the extent to which truth commissions, trials, amnesties and 
traditional justice approaches actually contribute to 
reconciliation is, at best, inconclusive.  
I agree with Thoms, Ron and Paris that “moving from 
‘faith-based’ to ‘fact-based’ discussions on transitional justice will 
require more sustained, careful, and comparative analyses of the 
transitional justice record.”136 This will require a combination of 
rigorous comparative thick descriptive analysis and richly 
detailed case studies employing a long time perspective. I join 
Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm in advocating a multi-method approach 
and broad definitions of impact, such as “whether the 
experience [e.g., a truth commission] resulted in substantive 
change.”137 Large-N analysis thus seems particularly unsuited to 
shed light on the complex and elusive reconciliation processes.  
                                                 
136 Oskar N.T. Thoms, James Ron, and Roland Paris, “State-Level Effects of 
Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 4.3 (2010): 329-354. 
137 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth,” 18. In this article, 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm deals with impact of truth commissions on subsequent 
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 While tentative assessments are both possible and 
necessary, the greatest challenge will be to let sufficient time 
elapse before passing (final) judgement. As I am reminded by 
the recurring debates on the Holocaust and the Armenian 
genocide, the exhumations of mass graves in Spain, and the 
ongoing post-transition trials in countries like Argentina, Chile, 
and Uruguay, reconciliation may take decades—even 
generations. 
                                                                                                      
human rights practices and democratic development, yet we find many of his 
theoretical points relevant to the challenges of assessing impact on 
reconciliation.  
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